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The Software Patent Experiment*
When it comes to patents, 
the U.S. has undergone an almost acci-
dental process of legal innovation over 
the last two decades. Standards have 
been eased: We now issue patents for 
inventions that, in the past, would not 
have qualified for protection. In ad-
dition, the scope of technologies that 
can be patented has been increased 
to include, among other things, gene 
sequences, computer programs, and 
methods of doing business.1
ver the past two decades, the scope of 
technologies that can be patented has 
been expanded to include many items 
previously thought unsuitable for patenting, 
for example, computer software. Today, the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office grants 20,000 or more software 
patents a year. Conventional wisdom holds that extending 
patent protection to computer programs will stimulate 
research and development and, thus, increase the rate 
of innovation. In this article, Bob Hunt and Jim Bessen 
investigate whether this has, in fact, happened. They 
describe the spectacular growth in software patenting, 
who obtains patents, and the relationship between a sharp 
focus on software patenting and firms’ investment in 
R&D.
* An earlier version of this article was 
published in: Patents, Innovation, and Economic 
Performance, Proceedings of the Conference of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development on “IPR, Innovation, and 
Economic Performance,” Paris, August 2003, 
OECD, Paris (forthcoming).
1 For an examination of the economic effects 
of changing patent standards, see Bob Hunt’s 
1999 Business Review article. For a brief history 
of intellectual property rights for computer 
programs, see Hunt’s 2001 Business Review
article.
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This article investigates the 
effects of extending the patent system 
to a field of technology — computer 
software — known for rapid 
innovation well before software patents 
became commonplace. According to 
our estimates, the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) now 
grants at least 20,000 software patents 
a year, and the numbers are growing 
rapidly. The European Commission 
is debating a proposal to formally 
recognize the patentability of computer 
programs in member countries. These 
changes have been controversial, 
but they are typically justified by the 
argument that making patents easier 
to obtain will increase the incentive 
to invest in research and development 
(R&D) and, therefore, the rate of 
innovation.2 In policy circles, it is fair 
to say this is the conventional wisdom. 
There is sound empirical 
evidence that, for at least some indus-
tries, the availability of patents is an 
important factor that explains the will-
ingness of firms to invest in R&D. For 
example, a number of surveys establish 
the important role that patents play in 
the U.S. chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries.3 But these surveys also show 
2 Many studies examine the relationship 
between growth in R&D and growth in 
productivity or economic output. See, for 
example, the working paper by Dominique 
Guellec and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie and the review article by Zvi Griliches.
3 See, for example, the article by Richard Levin, 
Alvin Klevorick, Richard Nelson, and Sidney 
Winter and the working paper by Wesley 
Cohen, Richard Nelson, and John Walsh. Using 
data compiled for that working paper, Ashish 
Arora, Marco Ceccagnoli, and Wesley Cohen 
present evidence that firms that rate patents as 
both important and effective tend to do more 
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that in many other industries, patents 
are not regarded as either very impor-
tant or effective in protecting one’s 
innovations. Other general reviews of 
the effects of the patent system reach 
ambiguous conclusions: Patents help in 
many circumstances but not in others, 
and in some instances, the effects may 
be deleterious.4
The research described in this 
article suggests there is some reason 
for concern about the economic effects 
of software patents.5 We found that 
software patents are not closely related 
to the creation of computer programs 
— the vast majority of software pat-
ents are obtained by firms outside the 
software industry.6 We also found that 
firms that focus on software patents, in 
the sense that a higher share of their 
new patents is software patents, have 
tended to focus less on research than 
other firms. Interpreting these facts is 
difficult, but they do suggest that the 
relationship between the increased 
availability of software patents and the 
incentive to invest in R&D is more 
complicated than is often assumed in 
the policy debate. In short, we did not 
find evidence in favor of the conven-
tional wisdom. 
CHANGES TO OUR 
PATENT SYSTEM
The American patent system 
has changed in a number of important 
ways over the last quarter of a century. 
  
4 For recent reviews, see the reports by the 
Federal Trade Commission, the article by 
Stephen Merrill et al., and the article by Nancy 
Gallini.
5 This article is based on Jim Bessen and Bob 
Hunt’s 2004 working paper.
6 We identify software firms as those companies 
included in Standard Industry Classification 
(SIC) 7372 (software publishers) as coded in 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat database in 
1999. For some purposes, we use a broader 
definition of software firms, that is, those 
classified in SIC 737 (computer programming, 
data processing, and other computer-related 
services).
lawyers call the prior art. In exchange, 
the inventor must disclose the nature 
of the invention, which is described 
in the patent document itself. The 
third requirement, nonobviousness, 
is less clear. It rules out the patent-
ing of an invention that would have 
been obvious to a practitioner in the 
relevant field at the time the invention 
was made. In other words, a patentable 
invention must be more than a trivial 
extension of the prior art. 
Our patent law and many ju-
dicial decisions provide instructions on 
how the nonobviousness requirement 
should be applied. During the 1980s, 
a number of judicial decisions revised 
these instructions in significant ways. 
In practice, the modified test for non-
obviousness is easier to satisfy than the 
one applied prior to the early 1980s. 
As a result many more inventions now 
qualify for patent protection.8 Other 
judicial decisions made it easier for a 
patent holder to obtain a preliminary 
injunction — a court order prohibiting 
a potentially infringing activity even 
before the question of infringement is 
decided by the court. Today, the threat 
of a preliminary injunction often car-
ries significant weight in negotiations 
between patent holders and alleged 
infringers.
Some of these changes include the 
relaxation of standards used to 
determine whether an invention 
qualifies for patent protection and the 
elimination of the so-called subject 
matter exception that precluded the 
patenting of computer programs.
What Is a Patent? For more 
than 200 years, the U.S. government 
has used patents to reward inventors 
for their discoveries. The reward is a 
grant of the legal right to exclude oth-
ers from making, using, or selling the 
patented invention for a limited period 
of time.7 If the patent is infringed, the 
patent owner may sue the infringer to 
recover lost profits. If the infringement 
was willful, the court may award ad-
ditional damages.
In certain ways, a patent is 
a custom design. The inventor’s right 
to exclude is limited to those claims
applied for and granted by the pat-
ent office. Those claims are based, at 
least in part, on the description of the 
invention contained in the application 
to the patent office.
Not Every Invention Can 
Be Patented. U.S. patent law per-
mits a patent to be granted only for 
inventions that are useful, new, and 
nonobvious. The first two require-
ments are fairly intuitive and sensible. 
One view of patents is that they are a 
bargain with inventors: The govern-
ment grants a temporary monopoly 
on an invention, but only if it is both 
useful and represents an advance over 
our existing knowledge, which patent 
The American patent system has changed in a 
number of important ways over the last quarter 
of a century. 
7 Today, a U.S. patent expires 20 years after the 
date of application. In the past, the patent term 
ran for 17 years from the date of grant.
8 The changes in the 1980s were instituted 
by the Federal Circuit, a specialized appeals 
court for patent and certain other cases, 
created in 1982. For more information about 
these decisions and their effect on subsequent 
litigation, see the article by Adam Jaffe. The 
economic effects of reduced patentability 
standards are examined in Hunt’s forthcoming 
article. 24   Q3  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org
Subject Matter Exceptions.
As a general principle, the American 
patent system is not designed to treat 
different kinds of inventions different-
ly. For example, when Congress passed 
the 1952 Patent Act, the committee 
report endorsing the bill stated that 
the new law was meant to apply to “ev-
erything under the sun made by man.”9
These words are often mentioned in 
judicial decisions where a federal court 
is confronted with the problem of in-
terpreting Congress’s intent in drafting 
that law.  
One exception to this rule 
was computer software. In the 1972 
decision Gottschalk v. Benson, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the computer 
program in question was a mathemati-
cal algorithm and, therefore, unpatent-
able subject matter. But it did not take 
very long before new decisions began 
to blur this seemingly bright distinc-
tion between computer programs and 
other inventions. For example, in the 
1981 decision in Diamond v. Diehr, the  Diamond v. Diehr, the  Diamond v. Diehr
Supreme Court ruled that an inven-
tion incorporating a computer program 
could be patented as long as the new 
and nonobvious aspects of the inven-
tion did not consist entirely of the 
software. Even this distinction gradu-
ally eroded.10
Any real difference in the 
treatment of software and other 
inventions was eliminated after a 1994 
appeals court decision (in re Alappat) 
upheld the patentability of a computer 
program that smooths digital data 
before displaying it as a waveform on 
a computer monitor. Shortly after that 
decision, the Patent and Trademark 
Office issued a comprehensive revi-
sion to its examination guidelines for 
computer-related inventions. There-
after, the number of software patents 
granted increased dramatically (Figure 
1). 
TAKING A CLOSER LOOK AT 
SOFTWARE PATENTS
Despite considerable inter-
est in the effects of granting patents 
on computer programs, there is no 
official list of software patents. The 
USPTO maintains a detailed system 
for classifying patented inventions by 
technology field — a sort of Dewey 
decimal system for patents. But there 
is no explicit classification for software 
inventions. Instead, researchers must 
devise their own ways of identifying 
software patents.11 The data used in 
this article are based on a simple key-
word search of the USPTO’s database 
of patents issued after 1975. We looked 
for patents that used the words “soft-
ware” or “computer program” in the 
description of the invention.12
According to this definition, 
about 1,000 software patents a year 
were granted in the early 1980s, in-
creasing to about 5,000 a year in 1990. 
The rate had doubled again by 1996. 
Nearly 25,000 software patents were 
granted in 2002. This was a period of 
very rapid growth in patenting — the 
number of patents of any kind granted 
in 2001 was 1.7 times larger than in 
1981 — but the growth in software 
patents was much larger still. As a re-
sult, the share of all patents counted as 
software patents increased from about 
2 percent in the early 1980s to nearly 
15 percent by 2002 (Figure 2). 
9 Senate Report No. 1979 82d Congress, 2nd
Session (1952), p. 5. 
10 For additional information on the changing 
treatment of software in patent law, see Hunt’s 
2001 article in the Business Review.
FIGURE 1
Software Patents Granted in the U.S.
(1976-2002)
Source:  U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and authors’ calculations.
Plots software patents by grant date.
11 For details on the different approaches, see 
the articles by John Allison and Mark Lemley, 
and by John Allison and Emerson Tiller, and 
the one by Stuart Graham and David Mowery. 
12 The exact search query is found in the Data 
Appendix. For a comparison of this definition 
and the resulting patent counts with others in 
the literature, see our working paper.  Business Review  Q3  2004   25 www.phil.frb.org
FIGURE 2
Software Patent Share in the U.S.
(1976-2002)
Source:  U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and authors’ calculations.
Plots the percentage of patents granted in a year that are software patents.
Software Patents Are an 
American Phenomenon. We can 
learn something about inventors and 
the owners of patents by examining in-
formation contained in the patent doc-
ument itself. This information reveals 
that software patents are a (relatively) 
home-grown phenomenon. During the 
1990s, 70 percent of software patents 
were obtained by inventors living in 
the U.S.; that is significantly higher 
than the share of domestic inventors 
for all other patents (53 percent). Simi-
larly, 70 percent of all software patents 
owned by companies went to firms 
headquartered in the U.S.; 51 percent 
of all other patents owned by compa-
nies went to American firms.13
Established Firms Obtain 
Most Software Patents. The typical 
owner of a software patent is a relative-
ly large, well-established firm. During 
the 1990s, companies obtained a larger 
share of software patents than other 
patents (88 percent vs. 80 percent). To 
put it another way, individuals were 
relatively less likely to obtain their own 
software patent than a patent on an-
other kind of invention. 
We can also compare the 
financial characteristics of firms that 
obtain software patents and other 
kinds of patents. We obtained detailed 
financial data on several thousand 
U.S. firms from Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat database, and using some 
existing databases and our own re-
search, we matched patents to those 
firms.14 We then used this information 
to compare the median firm ranked 
in terms of (1) the number of software 
patents obtained and (2) the number 
of other patents obtained.15 The me-
dian firm ranked in terms of software 
patents is much larger than the median 
firm ranked by other patents. If size is 
measured in terms of market value, the 
median software patentee is twice as 
large as the median patentee of other 
inventions ($24 million vs. $12 mil-
lion). Measured in terms of sales, it is 
50 percent larger ($13 million vs. $9 
million). Measured in terms of spend-
ing on research and development, it 
is 68 percent larger ($956 million vs. 
$376 million).
Most Software Patents 
Don’t Come from the Software In-
dustry. We were surprised to find that 
the vast majority of software patents 
are not obtained by firms associated 
with computer software. In the second 
half of the 1990s, firms in the soft-
ware industry received 1 percent of all 
patents granted to firms included in 
the Compustat file and at most 7 per-
cent of all software patents (Table).16
Manufacturers accounted for three 
out of four software patents. The top 
five firms in terms of software patents 
obtained in 1995 were IBM, Motorola, 
Hitachi, AT&T, and Hewlett-Packard. 
Nine of the top 10 firms ranked by 
software patents received in 1995 were 
on the list of the top 20 firms ranked 
by patents of any kind. 
13 The USPTO data indicate the owner of a 
patent at the time it was issued. The owner may 
be the individual(s) who made the invention or 
an organization (assignee), such as a firm or a 
government agency.
14 Compustat includes information on virtually 
all firms that file 10-K and 10-Q reports with 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.  
Our matching of patents to firms is based 
primarily on information contained in the 
NBER Patent Citations Data File and data 
generously provided to us by Tony Breitzman 
of CHI Research. For details on the matching 
process, see the Data Appendix.
15 The median identifies the firm where 50 
percent of all firms have more patents than 
it does and 50 percent of all firms have fewer 
patents than it does.
16 These statistics are for successful patents 
applied for during 1994-97. For this calculation, 
the software industry is defined as firms 
included in the SIC 737, but excluding IBM, 
which alone accounted for 6 percent of software 
patents granted. We treat IBM separately to rule 
out the possibility that these patterns are the 
result of a single, large company’s activity.26   Q3  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q3  2004   27 www.phil.frb.org
Firms in just three manufac-
turing industries (machinery, electron-
ics, and instruments) alone accounted 
for 66 percent of software patents 
granted to firms — a number that sig-
nificantly exceeds their impressive 54 
percent share of patents of any kind. 
These numbers are even more remark-
able when we examine the distribution 
of computer programmers across these 
industries.17 These are presumably the 
workers responsible for creating most 
new computer programs. Manufac-
turers of machinery, electronics, and 
instruments employed only 6 percent 
of all computer programmers and yet 
they obtained 66 percent of software 
patents. Firms outside the manufac-
turing sector employed 90 percent of 
computer programmers, but together 
they accounted for only 25 percent of 
software patents. It would appear that 
the distribution of software patents 
across industries reflects something 
other than the creation of software.
17 Our data on computer programmers come 
from various editions of the Occupational 
Employment Survey, published by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. We thank Joseph Bush of the 
BLS for his assistance. 
TABLE
The Distribution of Software Patents  (1994-97)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of all    Share of all Share of  All Software
software Share of all programmers all patents/ patent 
patents programmers & engineers patents R&D propensity
   
Manufacturing 75%# 11% 32% 88%# 3.8
  Chemicals (SIC 28) 5%# 1% 2% 15%# 2.5 1.5
  Machinery (SIC 35) 24%# 3% 7% 17%# 4.2 4.4
  Electronics (SIC 36) 28%# 2% 7% 27%# 6.8 9.6
  Instruments (SIC 38) 9%# 1% 4% 11%# 7.1 8.7
  Other manufacturing  9%# 5% 13% 18%# 2.3 1.9
Nonmanufacturing 25%# 89% 68% 12%#  3.0
  Software publishers
    (SIC 7372) 5%#      1%# 1.0
    33% 18%      1.0
  Other software* 2%#      1%# 2.8#
  
  Other nonmanufacturing 4%# 55% 49% 4%# 3.4 3.8
Addendum: IBM 6%# — — 2%# 5.0
}
Notes: This table is based on patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office applied for during the years 1994-97 and matched to a firm in the 
Compustat data set. Data on computer programmers are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Survey (various years) and the 
numbers include system analysts. The fifth column reports patents granted per $10 million of R&D in 1996 dollars. The last column reports the relative 
patent propensity (for software patents) estimated in the statistical analysis contained in Bessen and Hunt’s 2004 working paper and described on page 
27. The numbers in column 6 are presented relative to the estimated software patent propensity of firms contained in the business services sector (SIC 
73). For example, the estimated software patent propensity for the chemical industry is 1.5 times that for SIC 73.
*Firms in SIC 73, excluding those firms in SIC 7372.
#Excludes IBM.26   Q3  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q3  2004   27 www.phil.frb.org
WHY ARE THERE SO MANY 
SOFTWARE PATENTS? 
The previous section shows 
that firms obtain many software pat-
ents today, but they either could not, 
or did not wish to, obtain them in the 
past. Of course, the software sector of 
the economy has also grown rapidly 
over time. But these explanations tell 
us very little about why firms obtain 
software patents, and they potentially 
exaggerate the effects of legal changes 
by ignoring economic and other fac-
tors that may have contributed to the 
explosion in software patenting. Let’s 
look at the differences in the software-
patenting behavior of firms across 
industries and over time, and let’s look 
for any relationships between a firm’s 
software patenting behavior and its 
R&D investments. 
Estimating the Propensity 
to Patent. Industries vary significantly 
in their propensity to patent — that 
is, the average number of patents 
obtained from a given amount of 
resources spent on developing new 
products and processes. For example, 
during the mid-1990s, firms in the 
machinery, electronics, and instru-
ment industries received between four 
and seven patents (of any kind) for 
every $10 million in R&D they spent 
(see column 5 of the Table). That 
compares with only about one patent 
per $10 million in R&D for firms in 
the software industry. Based on this 
simple calculation, all else equal, if 
we observed a $10 million increase in 
R&D in each of these industries, we 
would expect to see four to seven more 
patents by manufacturers of machin-
ery, electronics, and instruments and 
one additional patent by software 
companies.
A more sophisticated analysis 
shows that firms apply for more soft-
ware patents when they are both more 
research-oriented and more capi-
tal-intensive and when the industry 
workforce consists of more program-
mers and engineers.18 We did not find 
a difference in the propensity to patent 
software between old and young firms 
except in the software industry. There, 
new firms have a significantly lower 
propensity to patent software than 
older firms in the same industry.19
Manufacturers, in general, 
have a much higher propensity to 
patent software than do firms in the 
software industry (see column 6 of 
the Table). After we account for R&D 
and other factors, firms in the ma-
chinery, electronics, and instruments 
industries obtain software patents at a 
rate four to 10 times higher than firms 
in the software sector.  In addition, 
the propensity to patent software is 
significantly higher for firms in indus-
tries in which their peers obtain more 
patents (of all kinds) per employee. In 
short, the pattern of software patent-
ing across U.S. firms seems to be more 
closely related to industry-wide varia-
tions in the utilization of patents in 
general than to the resources devoted 
to creating software.
The Rise in the Propensity 
to Patent Software Over Time. The 
average annual increase in the number 
of successful applications for software 
patents between 1987 and 1996 was 
16 percent. Our analysis shows that 
changes in firms’ R&D and capital 
investments, employment of pro-
grammers, and other factors explain 
about one-third of the rate of increase 
in software patents. The remain-
ing two-thirds (about 11 percentage 
points) represent an increase in the 
propensity to patent software over 
time. Compared with the rate for 1987, 
and holding all other factors constant, 
firms were successfully applying for 50 
percent more software patents in 1991 
and more than 150 percent more by 
1996. 
It is likely that a good part of 
this increase in the propensity to pat-
ent is the result of changes in the legal 
treatment of software patents.20 Such 
changes might work in two ways. The 
cost of obtaining software patents rela-
tive to the cost of obtaining any other 
patent may have fallen. Alternatively, 
the economic benefit conferred by a 
typical software patent, again relative 
to the benefit conferred by any other 
kind of patent, may have increased. 
Or both of these may be true. In other 
words, our analysis suggests that the 
relative profitability conferred by 
obtaining software patents increased 
over time.
DO MORE SOFTWARE PATENTS 
MEAN MORE R&D?
Ordinarily, when a firm ob-
tains additional patents, the profits 
Manufacturers, in 
general, have a much 
higher propensity
to patent software 
than do firms in the 
software industry.
18 This section is based on a regression 
analysis where we controlled for firm and 
industry characteristics and allowed for the 
possibility that patent propensity has changed 
over time. Details may be found in our 2004 
working paper. For an excellent example of 
this methodology applied to the American 
semiconductor industry, see the article by 
Bronwyn Hall and Rosemarie Ziedonis
19 A new firm in our analysis represents the 
first five years that a company is reported in 
Compustat.  
20 We cannot attribute all of this residual 
increase to legal changes because the pattern 
can also be explained by productivity growth, 
that is, increases in the number of inventions 
per programmer. Our review of the available 
studies suggests that any reasonable estimate of 
productivity growth in software would explain 
less than half of the residual increase in the 
propensity to patent software over time.28   Q3  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q3  2004   29 www.phil.frb.org
earned on its inventions should rise. 
This should encourage the firm to 
engage in more R&D. Similarly, when 
a firm engages in more R&D, it should 
invent more, and that should make it 
easier to get additional patents.  This 
is the traditional incentive theory of 
patents: By granting firms more and 
stronger property rights — that is, the 
right to capture more profits from their 
R&D investments — the government 
can stimulate innovation. 
Complements or Substi-
tutes? When economists think about 
a problem like this, they often inquire 
whether the variables in question (for 
example, R&D and software patents) 
are complements or substitutes. In the 
standard textbook exposition, two 
goods are complements if a fall in the 
price of one good induces an increase 
in the consumption of the other. An 
example of two goods that might act 
as complements might be coffee and 
cream. On the other hand, two goods 
are substitutes when a fall in the price 
of one good causes a decrease in the 
consumption of another good. An 
example of two goods that might act as 
substitutes would be public transit and 
automobiles. 
This intuition about comple-
ments and substitutes also applies to 
a firm’s choice of inputs. For example, 
if the cost of information technology 
(IT) declines, it is entirely possible 
that a firm will purchase more of the 
technology and hire more computer 
programmers who are skilled in using 
that technology. If that did happen, 
we would say that IT equipment and 
computer programmers are comple-
mentary inputs.21 If, on the other hand, 
we observed a decline in the number 
of computer programmers, we might 
conclude that IT equipment has substi-
tuted for computer programmers, who 
have become more expensive relative 
to the cost of IT equipment.
To economists, then, the con-
jecture that making software patents 
easier to obtain will increase invest-
ments in R&D is a claim that these 
patents and R&D are complementary 
inputs in the production of profitable 
innovations. All else equal, the legal 
changes described earlier increased the 
return from obtaining software patents 
relative to other patents. We have 
already seen that one response was a 
very large increase in the number of 
such patents (the quantity demanded 
rose as the cost of software patents 
fell), even after we’ve controlled for 
other factors. But what has the effect 
been on demand for R&D?
The Relationship Between 
R&D and Software Patents Has 
Changed. To answer this question, 
we can examine the relationship 
between changes in a firm’s research 
intensity (typically measured by the 
ratio of R&D to sales) and changes 
in the firm’s focus on software patents 
— its new software patents divided by 
all its new patents — over time.22 An 
increasing focus on software patents 
should reflect a decline in the firm’s 
cost of obtaining software patents 
relative to other patents. A posi-
tive correlation between changes in 
research intensity and changes in focus 
on software patents would suggest that 
software patents and R&D are indeed 
complementary inputs.23
Our research shows that, all 
else equal, during the late 1980s, firms 
that increased their focus on soft-
ware patents tended to increase their 
R&D intensity, but the relationship 
was weak. In other words, more likely 
than not, software patents and R&D 
were complementary inputs during the 
1980s. For the 1990s, we found a much 
stronger relationship, but it was nega-
tive: All else equal, increases in share 
of software patents were associated 
with decreases in research intensity. 
This suggests that in the 1990s, soft-
ware patents substituted for R&D.24
This effect is concentrated in 
the machinery (including computers) 
and electronics (including semiconduc-
tors) industries and the software indus-
try broadly defined25 — in other words, 
among the industries that account for 
21 Note that the total value of IT equipment 
purchased might rise or fall depending on 
how much more IT equipment is purchased in 
response to the drop in price. A firm’s demand 
for a good is said to be elastic when a decline in 
price, expressed as a percent change, induces 
a larger increase, again expressed as a percent 
change, in the quantity demanded.  
By granting firms more and stronger property 
rights — that is, the right to capture more
profits from their R&D investments — the
government can stimulate innovation. 
22 In our statistical analysis, we examined 
the relationship between changes in firms’ 
R&D intensity and changes in their focus on 
software patents over five-year intervals. We 
controlled for changes in input prices (including 
information technology), size of the firm, new 
vs. established firms, employment of computer 
programmers, and idiosyncratic factors specific 
to the firm or industry.
23A positive correlation means that increases in 
focus on software patents are associated with 
increases in R&D intensity and decreases in 
focus on software patents are associated with 
decreases in R&D intensity. 
24 We also found evidence that this negative cor-
relation had become even more negative by the 
late 1990s, but we cannot be certain this is true.
25 Here we count all firms in SIC 73 (Business 
Services) as software, and this includes IBM. 
If we exclude IBM from SIC 73, we do not find 
a systematic relationship between increases in 
focus on software patents and changes in R&D 
intensity among the remaining firms in SIC 73.28   Q3  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q3  2004   29 www.phil.frb.org
about two-thirds of all software pat-
ents. Outside of those industries, there 
was no systematic relationship, during 
the 1990s, between an increase in 
focus on software patents and changes 
in firms’ R&D intensity. 
Overall, the effect is econom-
ically significant. Taking the analysis 
literally, if the number of software 
patents grew only as rapidly as all other 
patents after 1991, the average R&D 
intensity of U.S. firms would be about 
7 percent higher than was actually re-
corded in 1997. This represents about 
$9 billion in additional private R&D 
spending for the entire U.S. economy.  
It also represents about five years of 
the annual average increase in the 
research intensity of American firms 
since 1953.  
But it is important to empha-
size that the analysis does not identify 
the exact relationship that explains 
why an increased focus on software 
patents is associated with a decline 
in research intensity. In the language 
of statistics, this approach identifies a 
correlation but not causation. Still, we 
can compare the patterns identified in 
the data with a number of hypotheses 
about the effects of software patents.
RECONCILING THEORIES 
WITH THE DATA 
While we can’t provide a full 
explanation of what happened, we can 
compare the facts identified so far with 
a variety of hypotheses or theoretical 
arguments that appear in the debate 
over changes to the U.S. patent system. 
The Incentive Theory. The 
first of these is the traditional incen-
tive theory, which argues that by mak-
ing available stronger property rights at 
lower cost, firms will have an increased 
incentive to engage in R&D. This 
conventional wisdom is often cited in 
arguments that favor extending pat-
ent protection to computer programs 
in Europe. Is our evidence consistent 
with this theory? 
The answer seems to be no. 
We observe that the vast majority of 
software patents are obtained by firms 
outside the software industry and 
with little investment in the inputs 
(computer programmers) required to 
develop software inventions. The dis-
tribution of software patents seems to 
follow more closely the general pattern 
of industry-wide propensities to patent 
than anything peculiar to software 
in itself. In general, industries known 
for prodigious patenting account for 
the vast majority of software patents 
obtained. Firms located in such indus-
tries have a higher propensity to patent 
software.
The increases in the total 
number of software patents and in the 
share of software patents are consistent 
with firms’ responding to a decline 
in the relative cost of obtaining these 
patents or, alternatively, an increase 
in the their cost effectiveness. But the 
negative correlation between increases 
in firms’ focus on software patents and 
their R&D intensity in the 1990s sug-
gests that firms may be substituting for 
R&D with software patents.
A Productivity Shock.
Another hypothesis is that the U.S. 
economy has experienced a large pro-
ductivity shock that favored inventions 
implemented via computer programs. 
Such a shock would be consistent with 
a large increase in software patenting 
and the long-run trend toward higher 
research intensity among American 
firms. But it is inconsistent with the 
negative correlation between increases 
in share of software patents and R&D 
intensity. What’s more, the observed 
increase in the propensity to pat-
ent software seems too large to be 
explained entirely by advances in the 
productivity of computer program-
ming.  
One variation on the 
productivity-shock hypothesis points 
to the potential for outsourcing of 
software development as the market 
for prepackaged software expanded. In 
other words, firms might have chosen 
to purchase software rather than to 
develop it internally. Such outsourc-
ing could explain a decline in research 
intensity, but firms outsourcing their 
software development would also likely 
reduce their focus on software patent-
ing. Conversely, software developers 
that benefit from outsourcing might be 
expected to increase both their R&D 
investments and software patenting. 
Neither of these patterns is consistent 
with the data.
It has also been suggested 
that the use of software in the R&D 
process significantly reduces the cost 
of doing R&D, and this might explain 
the observed negative correlation 
between focus on software patents and 
R&D intensity. But previous studies 
have shown that firms respond elasti-
cally to changes in the cost of doing 
R&D.26 In other words, the quantity 
The increases in 
the total number of 
software patents 
and in share of 
software patents 
are consistent with 
firms’ responding to a 
decline in the relative 
cost of obtaining 
these patents or, 
alternatively, an 
increase in their cost 
effectiveness.
26 See, for example, the article by Philip Berger 
and the article by Bronwyn Hall and John van 
Reenan. In addition, our analysis takes into 
account changes in the cost of software and the 
share of computer programmers in the industry 
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of R&D that firms engage in increases 
by at least as much, in percentage 
terms, as the decrease in its cost. Thus, 
even if software reduces the cost of 
research and development, R&D in-
tensity should not fall and might even 
increase.
Patent Thickets. In con-
trast to the incentive theory already 
described, suppose instead that firms 
in an industry assemble large patent 
portfolios in order to extract royal-
ties from competitors and to defend 
themselves from similar behavior by 
their rivals. Economists have come 
to describe such an environment as a 
patent thicket.27 In theory at least, ex-
tensive competition in patents, rather 
than inventions, may occur if firms 
rely on similar technologies and the 
cost of assembling large portfolios is 
not very high. In such an environment, 
firms may compete to tax each others’ 
inventions — for example, by demand-
ing royalties — and, in the process, 
It might also explain why software 
patents are more common in industries 
with high propensities to patent (ma-
chinery, electronics, and instruments) 
rather than in industries that focus 
primarily on developing software. Also, 
it is consistent with the observation 
that the propensity to patent is higher 
in industries in which firms obtain 
more patents per employee.
CONCLUSION
Nearly 50 years ago, scholar 
Fritz Machlup presented the results of 
his study on the efficacy of the patent 
system to the U.S. Congress. He con-
cluded: “If one does not know whether 
a system as a whole (in contrast to cer-
tain features of it) is good or bad, the 
safest policy conclusion is to muddle 
through....If we did not have a patent 
system, it would be irresponsible...to 
recommend instituting one. But since 
we have had a patent system for a long 
time, it would be irresponsible, on 
the basis of our present knowledge, to 
recommend abolishing it.”
What would Machlup say 
about a significant expansion of the 
patent system and a significant change 
in patentability standards, instituted 
in the absence of much evidence about 
the likely effects? Yet this is precisely 
what has happened in the U.S. over 
the last quarter of a century. 
These changes are often 
justified on the basis of conventional 
wisdom: Granting more and stron-
ger property rights will necessarily 
stimulate innovation. Our evidence 
suggests this assumption may be incor-
rect in the case of software patents. If, 
instead, the legal changes create patent 
thickets, the result might well be less 
innovation.
27 For evidence of this phenomenon in the 
electronics and semiconductor industries, see 
the article by Peter Grindley and David Teece 
and the one by Bronwyn Hall and Rosemarie 
Ziedonis.
28  For a theoretical model of this intuition, see 
the 2003 working paper by James Bessen. 
29 The term is derived from the example of two 
suspects arrested and interrogated separately. If 
they both remain silent, the prosecutor has little 
evidence, and each will receive a small penalty. 
If one suspect rats and the other doesn’t, the rat 
will reduce his own punishment, but the silent 
one will be punished severely. Knowing each 
other’s incentives, both suspects rat on each 
other.
reduce their competitors’ incentive to 
engage in R&D.28
The outcome of patent litiga-
tion and licensing agreements often 
depends on the size of the firm’s patent 
portfolio. This creates an incentive 
for firms to build larger patent portfo-
lios, especially when their rivals focus 
on patents as a competitive strategy. 
Economists sometimes describe this 
type of environment as a prisoner’s 
dilemma.29 All firms would be better off 
if they did not act in this way, but each 
firm would be worse off if it did not 
respond to a surge in patenting by their 
rivals. Under these circumstances, 
firms may find themselves competing 
in court, rather than in the market-
place.
The changing legal treatment 
of software patents might explain a 
systematic change in the behavior of 
some firms. During the early 1980s, 
patents were relatively costly to obtain, 
and this might have discouraged sub-
stitution away from R&D and toward 
strategic patenting. By the mid-1990s, 
software patents became a relatively 
inexpensive way to expand patent 
portfolios. This may have increased 
the attractiveness of a strategy that 
emphasizes patent rights over a strat-
egy based on R&D. 
The patent thicket explana-
tion is consistent with the observed 
rise in propensity to patent and the 
negative relationship between changes 
in share of software patents and re-
search intensity in certain industries. 
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Data Appendix
We count as a software patent any utility patent 
(excluding reissues) granted after 1975 that satisfies the 
following conditions:
1. The terms software or computer and program appear 
in the specification;
2. The terms antigen, antigenic, and chromatography do 
not appear in the specification; and
3. The terms chip, semiconductor,  semiconductor,  semiconductor bus, or circuit or
circuitry do not appear in the title.
Using this algorithm, we identified 130,650 
software patents granted in the years 1976 to 1999. For 
a comparison of this definition, and the resulting patent 
counts, with others used in the literature, see our work-
ing paper.
Matching Patents to Firms
Our statistical analysis relies on the matching 
of patents to companies in Standard and Poor’s Compu-
stat database. The majority of our matches are obtained 
from the NBER Patent Citations Data File (for details on 
that resource, see the working paper by Bronwyn Hall, 
Adam Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg). We supplemented 
those matches using information graciously provided to 
us by CHI Research (for information about these data, 
see www.chiresearch.com/information/customdata/
patdata.php3. 
Both of these sources link a numeric assignee 
number issued by the USPTO with an alphanumeric 
CUSIP code that can be used to identify firms contained 
in Compustat. In addition, we also matched the patents 
of the 25 largest publicly traded software firms and 100 
other large R&D performers not already matched in the 
data provided by the other sources.  
The resulting data set includes patents matched 
to 4,792 distinct subsidiaries and 2,043 parent firms. Over 
the period 1980-99, our sample accounts for 68 percent of 
successful U.S. patent applications by domestic nongov-
ernment organizations (mostly corporations) and 73 per-
cent of software patents granted to these organizations. 
The matched firms accounted for 91 percent of R&D 
spending reported by U.S. firms in Compustat. These cov-
erage ratios are quite stable over the two decades.
Still, only 37 percent of R&D performers in the 
Compustat data set were matched to their patents. This 
suggests the possibility of selection bias in some of our re-
sults, because firms successfully matched to their patents 
may somehow be systematically different from firms not 
matched. In particular, our coverage of the smallest and 
newest firms in Compustat is not likely to be as good as 
our coverage of larger and older firms. We conducted a 
number of statistical tests for selection bias and found this 
possibility had little or no effect on the results reported 
here. For details, see our working paper.
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